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Abstract: Grappling with the marginalization of the marginal in Western thinking, this paper sets up
a dialogue between Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy and Johann Baptist Metz’s political theology in
order to learn from their thoughts on the suffering of victims. For both Levinas and Metz, the idea of
theodicy as an explanation of suffering is linked to the ontological conception of time and history,
and therefore useless and unjustifiable by nature. The essential question of this research is how to
give meaning to the concrete suffering of humanity in order to redeem history from the concept of
an evolutionary progress which limits the possibility of hearing the cries of the victims of history.
This article will show how Levinas’s and Metz´s rejection of traditional theodicy is closely related
to the concepts of memory and history and, therefore, the paper will demonstrate how traditional
theodicy becomes for both thinkers an ethical theodicy. Consequently, the ethical account of theodicy
replaces the attempt to negotiate the goodness and power of God with the pain of human beings.
From this perspective, ethics is shaped by a response to the cry of victims which summons the
subject to understand freedom as limited and subordinated to ethical responsibility. In responding to
suffering, philosophy and theology can meet beyond idealism and dogmatism.
Keywords: theodicy; ethics; suffering; victim; responsibility
1. Introduction
Lithuanian philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and German theologian Johann Metz share the same
interest in doing justice to the victims of history and rejecting any attempt to justify the suffering of
the innocents. Indeed, by overcoming the totalitarian model of historical time which conceals the
particular experiences of pain and suffering, Levinas and Metz recover singularity and individuality in
history. It is an attempt to go “beyond the universal judgments of history, that offense of the offended
which is inevitably produced in the very judgment issued from universal principles” (Levinas 1969,
p. 247). This novelty in history places philosophy and theology before the tremendous misery that
these individuals have experienced particularly during the years of Nazi attempts to exterminate the
entire population of European Jews.
Furthermore, since the Bible, according to Levinas, the prospect of an era of peace, justice, and
liberty accustomed people to thinking that time was going somewhere and present misfortunes would
have a final, happy ending. Therefore, the concept of theodicy as justification of suffering from
the perspective of God has raised the hope that these sufferings are inserted into an “overall plan.”
According to Levinas, this theodicy is a temptation of man, which helps to maintain a certain tranquility
despite the helplessness of life, and saves people from dealing with the abyss of suffering by justifying
the unjustifiable.
While for Metz theodicy is fundamental, Levinas, in line with Kant, is reluctant to rationalize the
pain and cries of the victims and for this reason he claims a theology without theodicy. Metz, however,
points to a theodicy as a disturbing question and not as a comforting answer and in this sense, he is
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responding to Levinas’s preoccupation with the untold pain. Furthermore, for Metz, theodicy is critical
to political theologizing, but it is understood as an open question that can never be fully responded
to. Traditional theodicies attempt to defend God’s goodness and omnipotence in relation to human
suffering, whereas Metz understands theodicy as a troubling questioning unto God for suffering in the
world. For Metz, this questioning discourse is the cry for the salvation of others, of those who suffer
unjustly, of the victims and vanquished in our history.
Following this line of thinking, this article will show how Levinas´s and Metz´s rejection of
traditional theodicy is closely related to the concepts of memory and history and, therefore, the paper
will demonstrate how traditional theodicy becomes an ethical theodicy for both thinkers. There is no
other work of this scope that brings Levinas and Metz into relation. However, in so doing, I am not
trying to make equivalent or homogenize their complex philosophical and theological projects. Rather,
I have sought to take advantage of their similar perspective in relation to history in order to explore
responsibility for the victims of history and their suffering. In fact, both thinkers agree that the biblical
spirit provides essential categories to deal with suffering, death, and justice. Furthermore, they share
the same memories: the memories of the Holocaust which shape their views on suffering and death.
From this perspective, both thinkers challenge the Western idealism of philosophy and theology by
giving voice to the victims of history, acknowledging the concrete reality of suffering and death.
I will develop a critical analysis of the consequences of the concept of theodicy in relation to death
and suffering, the myths of consolation in relation to suffering, and finally the concrete response to evil
through ethics. Theodicy as an attempt to explain suffering is meaningless, and in Levinas’s and Metz´s
estimation, a source of immorality. Suffering is linked to evil and therefore useless; it is unjustifiable by
nature. However, it is my contention that in Levinas’ and Metz´s perspective, suffering, and therefore
theodicy, can only find meaning in ethics. Suffering has meaning as a subject taking upon itself the
suffering of the other human. The human encounter is opened up by the other’s suffering.
This paper has three parts. The first develops a critical analysis of the consequences of Levinas´s
concept of theodicy in relation to death and suffering, the myths of consolation in relation to suffering,
and finally the concrete response to evil through ethics. I will show how Levinas initially rejects
the concepts of memory and theodicy to the extent to which they stem from a temporality linked to
ontology and they are therefore ignorant of human suffering. Suffering is linked to evil and therefore
useless; it is unjustifiable by nature. However, suffering, and therefore theodicy, can find a meaning in
ethics. Suffering has meaning as a subject taking upon itself the suffering of the other human.
The second part advances towards the problematization of Metz’s concepts of dangerous memory
and theodicy. From this discussion will emerge a subjectivity essentially bound to the other’s death and
suffering, and therefore a solidary and compassionate subject. From this perspective some confluences
will be found in relation to Levinas’s ethical theodicy. For Metz, the memory of the suffering of others,
the story of the passion of men, is the only macro narrative that continues to be valid. Therefore, this
memory does not refer to a memory that helps to assert and strengthen identity, but a memory that
questions firm and secure identities. This questioning opens a fissure in subjectivity, compelling a
response to the other’s claim. In this way the suffering other becomes the authority that cannot be
avoided and calls everyone to political compassion.
The third part concludes by pointing differences within an essential concordance between Levinas
and Metz on the relationship between memory and theodicy. From this perspective, a fundamental
asymmetry in human relationships derives. Asymmetry in Metz acquires the connotation of the
authority of suffering, and in Levinas the appearance of the helpless other commands a responsibility.
2. Levinas’s Ethical Theodicy
2.1. Memory and Suffering
Memory and the narration of past events, particularly the Exodus and the giving of the Torah on
Mount Sinai, are essential elements of present Jewish identity which is celebrated in the quotidian
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liturgy and prayer. Metz has rescued this characteristic of the Jewish psyche for Christian theology
by pointing out that this memory is the basic category not only for a detachment of theology from
idealistic philosophy but also for a political redemption of the past suffering in history. However, the
concept of memory in history is criticized by Levinas, particularly in his 1974 book Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence. In fact, in this work Levinas presents memory as the vehicle of representation
through which the past is made present. In this sense, memory is totalitarian and ontological (Spargo
2006; Ombrosi 2011; Poleshcuk 2014; Losada-Sierra and Mandalios 2015). As Benso remarks, “Memory
is an instrument through which the self anchors its present into the past: it appropriates the past which
would otherwise remain other—unthinkable because unthought of—and puts an end to its alterity”
(Benso 2003, p. 9).
However, is memory always ontological for Levinas? Levinas, in fact, refers to memory in various
parts of his work, particularly when referring to the horror of the Holocaust. The same book Otherwise
than Being, for example, is dedicated “to the memory of those who were closest among the six millions
assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations,
victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-Semitism” (Levinas 1994b). Furthermore,
in Signature, Levinas claims that his biography “is dominated by the presentiment and the memory
of the Nazi” (Levinas 1997, p. 291). In an interview, when questioned by Bertrand Révillon about
the Klaus Barbie trial, Levinas responds that “it is in the register of the dreadful. A horror that can
never be repaired or forgotten” (Levinas 2004, p. 129). Furthermore, reflecting on his experience of the
concentrations camps, Levinas defines it as a “tumour in the memory” (Levinas 1996, p. 120). In this
vein, “the presentiment of these terrible years, the unforgettable remembering of those years” has
been “a fundamental experience of my life and my thought” (Levinas 2006, p. 117). Furthermore,
the denial and forgetting of the Holocaust, Levinas complains, is “[t]he final act of this destruction”
being accomplished today “by the would-be ‘revisionists of history’” (Levinas 1998a, p. 98).
Therefore, Levinas criticizes the concept of memory in the same way as he criticizes history and at
the same time voices the worry about the possibility of forgetting the suffering of the victims due to
the “virile” account of history. In Levinas’s estimation “the past of the other concern me,” but “it is
not a representation for me” (Levinas 1998a, p. 115). Therefore, there would be a different way from
that of the Platonic reminiscence to approach the past. This means that the past of the other is not an
essence represented by consciousness, but it has its “own signification.” This signification, in Levinas’s
estimation, can only be unveiled by the witness, by the other who suffers, as he says: “other shore the
Other absolutely other . . . is alone capable of marking, and of connecting with the past” (Levinas 1969,
p. 283). As James Hatley affirms “[f]or Levinas, memory of the other ultimately engages me in a past
that could never have been mine” (Hatley 2005, p. 217).
Memory is therefore not an action of the subject’s consciousness (representation), but a testimony
of the victim. Victims carry their memory. In this sense memory is less the work of representation
than a movement provoked by exteriority, by another who is not strictly subject to ideation or to
the mournful survivors’ perception. In Joseph Rosen’s words, “testimony would bear witness to the
alterity that is previous to the memory of the self” (Rosen 2006, p. 289). In this way the face would
be protected from the objectivations of mnemic or historic representations. This is a memory of the
immemorial in the sense that it is my hearing of infinity’s call that occurs in the encounter with the
vulnerable and suffering face of the other.
Levinas himself is an eyewitness and a victim, he is the other who testifies how it is “difficult to
communicate . . . this kind of interrupted despair which was the Hitlerian period in Europe” (Robbins
and Levinas 2001). In communicating his own memory, Levinas is loyal to his affirmation that “[t]he
survivor of the “Hitlerian massacres . . . is Other in relation to martyrs. He is consequently responsible and
unable to remain silent. It is impossible to remain silent” (Levinas 1997, p. 132). There is an obligation
to speak. As Sandor Goodhart remarks “[t]he truth of testimony is not the truth of representation”
(Goodhart 2005, p. 148). That is, the testimony of the victim is the voice of the other denying any
attempt to explain or justify such suffering.
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From these comments, it is also clear that Levinas rejects any attempt to look for an explanation of
suffering (Geddes 2018). Simply the testimony, the cry of the victims, could wake up sleeping rationality
to interrupt the perseverance of being in its being. This interruption of the conatus essendi (the effort to
persevere in one’s being) is possible when consciousness loses its first place and responsibility arises in
subjectivity. That is, Levinas is claiming that consciousness plays a secondary role in the plot of history
so that consciousness awakens to humanity. In Levinas words, “[t]he humanity of consciousness is
definitely not in its powers, but in its responsibility,” and the grand event of history is the apparition
of the human. Therefore, it is the attention to the other which, across the cruelties of the twentieth
century “can be affirmed as the very nexus of human subjectivity” (Levinas 1998a, p. 173). In other
words: “[t]o be I and not only an incarnation of a reason is precisely to be capable of seeing the offense
of the offended, or the face” (Levinas 1969, p. 247)
The openness of time to hope is also the message of the Talmudic commentary “Beyond Memory,”
from the Tractate Berakhot 12a–13b. In the Talmudic text, Levinas attempts to challenge the meaning
of memory in Jewish life by looking for a new meaning of historical time. Past events continue to play
a role in the Jewish psyche, that is, the Exodus cannot be forgotten. However, memory, in spite of the
historical events experienced by Israel, particularly in the twentieth century, needs to be open to the
new, to hope. In the Gemara, in fact, something new is announced:
Does it not say in Isaiah 43:18, “Remember former things no more, nor consider the things of
old?” “Remember former things no more,” is [the emancipation] from subservience to the
empires; “Nor consider the things of old” is the exodus from Egypt. What is the meaning of
[Isaiah 43:19]: “Behold, I will do new things-See, they are already unfolding”? Rav Yosef
taught . . . (Levinas 1994a, p. 83).
Levinas wonders “[w]hat are these new things” beyond memory? The answer is given in the
text by Rav Joseph: “It is the war of Gog and Magog” (Levinas 1994a, p. 83). This war is described
in Ezekiel 38–39 as a final end-times attack on Israel, a total war, the war “[b]eyond any memory”
(ibid.). This final war ends up with Gog’s defeat by God himself. However, eschatology in Levinas’s
estimation, is not the end of history, but the opening to the call of infinity in the vulnerability of the
face. Openness to the face of the other is evident in the figure of Abraham. Having as a background
the discussion between Bar Kapra and Rav Eliezer about the use of the new name Abraham instead of
Abram, Levinas interprets the prohibition to use the old name Abram as a message about time. It is a
time open, as Abraham’s tent, to the arrival of the other, always unpredictable, trusting “new things
and even the miracle required for universal peace” (Levinas 1994a, p. 86). It is a time when goodness
hopefully rises facing the depths of despair, as Levinas affirms: “The ‘I’ of men, forced by suffering
back into the shackles of the self, breaks forth, in its misery, into mercy” (Levinas 1994a, p. 89).
Therefore, memory as a tentative appropriation of suffering gives way to the memory of the
immemorial from which the responsibility for human suffering stems. In fact, memory stemming from
consciousness is unable to contain the pain of suffering. On the contrary, in the encounter with the
suffering face of the other the subject feels itself subjected to respond instead of trying to comprehend
or systematize suffering. In Levinas’s view:
The misery that calls out for our pity, our justice, our freedom and our work, is replaced by an
ambiguous passion in which grief is transformed into ritual and sacrament, and unfolds like
a scenario. It is as if its human meaning were not sufficiently full, as if another mysterious
night enveloped the night of human suffering, as if some celestial salvation could triumph
without ridding it of visible misery (Levinas 1997, p. 104).
This is why Levinas tries “to think time in the devotion of a theology without theodicy” (Levinas
1998a, p. 177).
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2.2. The Holocaust and the End of Theodicy
Richard Bernstein has emphasized the central role that the experiences of evil had for Levinas’s
philosophizing. For him “Levinas’s entire philosophic project can best be understood as an ethical
response to evil” (Bernstein 2002, p. 252). Bernstein endeavors to prove that the primary stimulus
of Levinas’s thought is to be understood as his response to the evil that flared up in the twentieth
century. Unlike Bernstein, Fagenblat considers that the “primary stimulus” is the Judaic tradition itself,
and therefore “Levinas’s philosophical works are midrashically determined from beginning to end”
(Fagenblat 2010, p. xxiii). Ethics in Fagenblat’s contention is “best understood as a secularized and
generalized account of the Jewish covenant of faith” (Fagenblat 2010, p. xxv). Fagenblat however
accepts that the Holocaust “touched Levinas personally, vocationally and intellectually” (Fagenblat
2010, p. xiii). Bernstein’s thesis is insufficient to explain Levinas’s entire philosophical project, toning
down for example his encounter with Husserl and Heidegger and also the influence of Russian
literature and the Bible. However, it is true that the experience of the Holocaust provides Levinas with
an existential and essential stimulus to think about suffering and evil in history. This is why after
remembering Levinas’s dedication of Otherwise than Being, Maurice Blanchot, one of Levinas’s closest
friends, wondered “how to philosophize, how to write, in memory of Auschwitz, about those who
said to us, oftentimes in notes buried near the crematoria: ‘know what has happened, do not forget,
and at the same time, you will not be able to’,” and he adds “this is the thought that traverses, that
bears, the whole of Levinas’s philosophy” (Blanchot 1980, pp. 86–87). In this sense, Levinas affirms:
“[i]f there is an explicitly Jewish moment in my thought, it is the reference to Auschwitz, where God let
the Nazis do what they wanted” (Levinas 1998b, p. 175).
Levinas’s experience of the Holocaust led him to criticize any attempt to intellectualize the
experience of suffering of the victims. In the essay “Useless Suffering” Levinas describes the
phenomenological condition of suffering to conclude that suffering is meaningless and therefore
asystematic and beyond any intellectual comprehension. Agamben has expressed something similar
when he affirms that “the aporia of Auschwitz is, indeed, the very aporia of historical knowledge:
a non-coincidence between facts and truth, between verification and comprehension” (Agamben 2005,
p. 4). Phenomenologically, suffering is an excess with a sensorial content. This means a datum in
consciousness which, however, surpasses it as the unassumable. It is, in Levinas’s words, “the ache of
pain—evil” (Levinas 1998a, p. 92). This is why suffering is refractory to knowledge, to any synthesis
of the transcendental subject, to the unification in a horizon of meaning. This suffering cannot be
comprehended, systematized, or explained. It is the suffering of the innocents which “is very difficult
to communicate” (Robbins and Levinas 2001, p. 39).
Suffering is, in fact, the meaninglessness: what shies away from rational comprehension. It is a
denial of meaning which, in Levinas’s terms, is “thrusting itself forward as a sensible quality” (ibid.).
Therefore, Levinas rejects any attempt to give an ultimate meaning to suffering being understood
as a way to conquer an end. It cannot be understood, for instance, as a deserved punishment for
individual acts, or as a path towards a spiritual refinement and a strengthening of character. Nor as a
way used by the state to maintain social cohesion and stability. None of these teleologies, individually
or collectively, may account for the meaninglessness of suffering: neither history nor divine providence,
that teleologically expect a happy end, is achieved after the necessary suffering.
The attempt to explain the suffering of the innocents, and particularly the attempt to come to terms
with the omnipotence and goodness of God is per se “the source of all immorality” (Levinas 1998a,
p. 99), the unjustifiable par excellence. Levinas’s reading of suffering (gnoseologically never properly
captured) would lead to thinking that it has a boomerang effect in Levinas’s critique, to the extent to
which he ends up glorifying the same suffering he declares meaningless. However, as will be shown
later on, Levinas’s intention is to move from the intellectual comprehension of suffering to an ethical
response, meaning from a traditional theodicy to an ethical theodicy. In this way, if suffering cannot be
explained and intellectualized it is because it compels a response before there is any attempt to explain
it. It is only in this way that suffering has a meaning because it cries out for concrete commitment.
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This is the purpose of theodicy: to find meaning in human suffering, either from religious faith
or from the idea of progress. From a religious perspective theodicy is the seductive temptation “in
making God innocent, or in saving morality in the name of faith, or in making suffering—and this
is the true intention of the thought that has recourse to theodicy—bearable” (Levinas 1998a, p. 97).
The basic question of religious theodicy is, as Bernstein says, “how we can reconcile the existence of
evil with a faith in a God who is omniscient, omnipotent and beneficent—a God who is the creator
of the universe and all living beings” (Bernstein 2002, p. 255). This question has been part of the
European conscience, whose origins can refer to the Bible and its attempt to explain pain and suffering
by way of sin. However, the twentieth century constituted a challenge to theodicy. The prevailing evil
came to unimaginable proportions.
This is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the totalitarianisms of right and
left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia.
This is the century that is drawing to a close in the obsessive fear of the return of everything these
barbaric names stood for: suffering and evil inflicted deliberately, but in a manner no reason set limits
to, in the exasperation of a reason becoming political and detached from all ethics. In this panorama,
the Holocaust is particularly “the paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, in which evil appears in
its diabolical horror” (Levinas 1998a, p. 97). The disproportion between suffering and theodicy is
manifested in Auschwitz with blinding clarity. In this assessment Levinas is certainly very close to
Metz who believes that Auschwitz is a horror situated beyond any known theology, a horror that
makes all talk about God seem empty and blind.
In Levinas’s estimation there is a direct relationship between evil and suffering. Suffering
derives from evil and from it receives its more profound articulation as absurdity: “[s]uffering,
extreme passivity, the foolish par excellence, absurdity, loneliness—misery and neglect. Solitude
and confinement” (Levinas 1986, p. 17). This is why suffering is useless; it is “for nothing.” In this
vein, Arthur Cohen calls Jewish suffering in the concentration camps the tremendum, “for it is the
monument of a meaningless inversion of life to an orgiastic celebration of death” (Cohen 1993, p. 11).
To Cohen this is a suffering beyond comprehension. Levinas exemplifies this uselessness of suffering
in some physical maladies in which abandonment and anguish are part of the cruelty of the suffering.
It is a request for aid, for curative help, in which the immanence of psychism is ruptured to open
to transcendence. This means that this phenomenological absurdity finds a possibility of meaning
in ethics:
must not humanity now, in a faith more difficult than before, in a faith without theodicy,
continue to live out Sacred History; a history that now demands even more from the resources
of the I in each one of us, and from its suffering inspired by the suffering of the other, from
its compassion which is a non-useless suffering (or love), which is no longer suffering “for
nothing,” and immediately has meaning? (Levinas 1998a, p. 100).
From an ethical point of view, there is therefore a distinction between the suffering in the other
and the suffering in me. The suffering in the other “solicits me and calls me” (Levinas 1998a, p. 94).
This is why the useless suffering in the other only has a meaning “which is not possible to contest,” that
is, “the suffering of suffering, the suffering for the useless suffering of the other, the just suffering in me
for the unjustifiable suffering of the other, opens suffering to the ethical perspective of the inter-human”
(ibid.). This suffering for the suffering of the other is the very bond of human subjectivity. According
to Levinas this is the supreme principle of ethics. It is the very concreteness of the ‘horror of evil’ that
calls forth the ethical response that ruptures the persistence in being. The conatus essendi is ruptured
by the messianic subject who takes the suffering of the other and offers help and comfort to him/her.
Furthermore, it is only by ethically responding to the evil inflicted on my fellow human beings that I
become fully human. Levinas elsewhere states that “to be human is to suffer for the other” (Levinas
1994c, p. 188). In Levinas’s estimation the constitution of the unicity of the “I” is established through
the subject’s irreplaceability in relation to the responsibility for the other.
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In relation to the problem of theodicy, Levinas derives from the failure of theodicy as traditionally
understood, an ethical account of theodicy in which the discourse about evil and pain claims for an
ethical commitment of the subject. This ethical account therefore replaces the attempt to negotiate the
goodness and power of God with the pain of human beings.
3. Metz’s Theodicy as a Disturbing Question
3.1. The Memory That Perturbs the Present
Similar to Levinas, Metz’s consideration of memory has initially a biographical content.
His memory of the experience of the war in 1945 profoundly marked his theologizing, particularly
from the 1960s onward (Downey and Metz 1999).
In fact, from this biographical background, Metz expresses how memory plays a central role
in his theologizing. For him, memory is a powerful tool that allows the logos of theology and
philosophy to overcome idealism and to be critical towards the prevailing modes of logic of domination
which gnoseologically, as Ostovich states, equate “knowing with control” (Ostovich 2005, p. 48), and
historically ignore the presence of the vanquished. Memory “breaks through the magic circle of the
prevailing consciousness” (Metz 1980, p. 90), in order for the oppressed to be regarded. That is,
memory prevents us from interpreting history “simply as a history of success, triumph and victory”
(Metz 1980, p. 126). Furthermore, Metz considers “common biblical thinking as memory,” to be the
core of Israel’s heritage to Western culture (Metz 1999a, p. 92). This heritage belongs to the “European
history of spirit” and therefore to the “history of the constitution of a reason which intends to be
practical as subjective and solidary freedom” (Metz 1980, p. 59).
Despite belonging to reason, Metz wonders whether memory can be regarded in philosophy as
a fundamental concept rather than only a regional or derived one. The response to this question, in
Metz’s view, depends on the extent to which philosophy is able to deal with the relation, present in the
concept of memory, between reason and history. That is, to the extent to which the original question of
truth is placed under the umbrella of practical critical reason or, on the contrary, follows the idealism
of traditional historiography. Memory is in fact indispensable for a philosophy that wants to become
practical and not merely theoretical. For Metz, “[t]he essential dynamics of history consists of the
memory of suffering as a negative consciousness of future freedom and as a stimulus to overcome
suffering within the framework of that freedom” (Metz 1999a, p. 53).
From a philosophical perspective, Metz analyzes the above mentioned connection between reason
and history in both the tradition of the Platonic anamnesis and that of the critical use of reason in
line with Kantian practical reason and the Marxist critique of ideology. From the first perspective, in
Plato’s Meno, anamnesis is the basis for rational knowledge, and therefore constitutive of reason itself.
Rational knowledge is rooted in a previously known truth, remembered through the Socratic maieutic.
Metz recalls how Plato’s remembering of a priori knowledge originates in the Homeric poets inspired
by the muses. That is, ‘the basis of anamnesis is . . . attributed by Plato to divine inspiration” (Metz
1980, p. 187). The basic Platonic idea, that is, knowledge based on a previously known divine truth,
persists not only in Neoplatonism but also in dissimilar traditions such as those of Thomas Aquinas’s
a priori light of reason, Descartes’s innate idea of God, and Leibniz’s defense of a priori knowledge
against the Aristotelian concept of memory defended by sensualism.
Furthermore, the connection between reason and history is also present in both the hermeneutical
and the critical–practical traditions that stem from the Hegelian system. The hermeneutical tradition
was important particularly for the fight against historicism and the concomitant “destruction of the
relationship between life and history” (Metz 1980, p. 189). From Metz’s perspective, the distinction
made by historicism between memory and history ends up depriving history of memory and tradition,
and therefore privileging the dominant knowledge of science in history. For Wilhelm Dilthey,
for example, the key differentiation between human and natural sciences concerns history. In fact,
the purpose of the human sciences is to grasp human and historical life which requires an inner
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articulation of the temporal structures our own experience and the interpretation of the external
objectivations of others. From this perspective, memory is rooted in the concept of experience and
therefore “unable to free it from the suspicion of historical psychologism” (Metz 1980, p. 191).
The other movement in which memory plays a relevant role and from which Metz received a
crucial influence is what he describes as “a critical and practical philosophy of history and society”
(Metz 1980, p. 192). This critique is not just theoretical, rather it deals with the problem of theory and
praxis in practical reason, “that is, in its realization, always situated within certain social and historical
relationships of foundation and reference” (ibid.). In this sense, history is and remains immanent
in reason, which becomes practical in its liberating task of criticism. This practical task of liberating
criticism, established initially by the Enlightenment, recognizes “that memory was not simply an object,
but an inner aspect of all critical consciousness” (Metz 1980, p. 193). This critical use of memory as the
constitutive problem of practical reason is found in some members of the Frankfurt School, particularly
Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, and Theodor Adorno. Metz highlights the Jewish background of
these thinkers, which allows them to seek a different source for truth, a different form of knowledge,
and particularly to extract from the experience of persecution and suffering a different perspective
on history.
In fact, in relation to memory, Metz recognizes Benjamin’s memory of suffering in the world as
a way of realizing reason and freedom against the banal and unreflected “idea of a non-dialectical
progress of reason” (ibid.). This idea is developed by Benjamin in his thesis containing a new theory of
knowledge in which the concept of reality is both facticity and possibility. Knowledge contains life
in the frustrated past and as a consequence opens the possibility of the exigency of justice, because
the victims of history remain alive thanks to memory. For Benjamin, memory is not an instrument
for exploring the past, but the scenario in which the historian has to dig to rescue lost fragments of
history that allow the present to be unravelled as a constellation of dangers. This is what comes to
expression in the Benjaminian concept of “arrested dialectic” (Dialektik im Stillstand). This is to break
the usual patterns of perception and interpretation of time that degrade people to mere elements of an
objective process that is but the manifestation of the system of domination that subdues singularities.
This masking that celebrates itself as evolution can only be contested by breaking the spell involved in
the representation of progress, a representation that dominates both the philosophies of history and
the historicist positivism.
In Herbert Marcuse, the critical aspect of memory is initially exposed in a psychoanalytic context
in which the discovery of the capacity to remember “goes hand in hand with the restoration of the
knowing content of the imagination and in this way, the recherche du temps perdue becomes a vehicle of
liberation” (Metz 1980, p. 193). Then, in the context of the theory of history and society, the restoration
of memory to its rightful place as a means of liberation becomes fundamental: it is “one of the noblest
tasks of philosophy” (ibid.). Metz agrees with Marcuse in retaining Heidegger’s fundamental insight
“that something extraordinarily important had been forgotten in the modern world” (Jay 1982, p. 2).
However, unlike Heidegger, Metz and Marcuse consider that the purpose of memory is not the
restoration of the consciousness of Being, but the rise of dangerous messages from the past to the
present. In fact, Marcuse is the one who uses the adjective “dangerous” in relation to memories, which
is so important for Metz‘s Faith and History and Society and for later works. In fact, Marcuse says:
“[r]emembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous insights, and the established society seems to be
apprehensive of the subversive contents of memory” (Marcuse 1966, p. 98). In this way, both thinkers
stress the emancipatory potential of memory, because the messages of the past brought by memory
break the power of the given facts (the naturalization of history) in order to place the suffering of men
as a critical impulse of present and future transformations.
Metz takes sides with the Frankfurt School in considering the memory of suffering as a central
category of practical critical reason. He also endorses the idea inherited from the Enlightenment that
the processes of emancipation are the noblest task of critical reason. In this sense, the memory of
critical-anamnestic reason must be none other than the memory of freedom. However, Metz is at odds
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with the Enlightenment’s interpretation of the history of freedom as a history of progressive mastery
over nature and, in this sense, as a dominative praxis that springs from the same history understood as
totality. This way of understanding freedom ends up destroying memory, forgetting in the process the
pain that produces the cry of the victims, and destroying also the feeling of guilt.
In Metz’s view the evocation of freedom must emphasize the memory of suffering. This suffering
becomes the history of freedom in a “dangerous tradition” that cannot be overcome or assumed by
any interpretation or later review. It is the “dangerous tradition” that does not historicize itself but
maintains the vigor of the cry of the victims. In this way, reason is sensitized by suffering to the point
that freedom can only be expressed in reference to suffering and not as the a priori of reason. The a
priori of reason is now the victim of history. This subversive memory opposes what Metz calls “false
consciousness.” This type of consciousness is an idealized and superficial mode of relation with the
past, hiding danger and pain through harmless clichés. False consciousness means that any past seems
better. It is also the glorious memory of war and its heroes, forgetting the dead in the process. For
Metz, memory is dangerous precisely because it does not allow reconciliation with the past of pain,
[t]hey [memories] illuminate for a few moments and with a harsh steady light the questionable
nature of things we have apparently come to terms with, and show up the banality of our
supposed ‘realism’. They break through the canon of all that is taken as self-evident, and
unmask as deception the certainty of those “whose hour is always there” (John 7.6). They
seem to subvert our structures of plausibility. Such memories are like dangerous and
incalculable visitants from the past (Metz 1980, pp. 109–10).
Metz shares with Kant an appreciation of practical reason’s capacity to exceed the confines of
speculative reason. This appreciation is also shared by Levinas in his concern for an ethics that is
not founded on any ontology, however Metz and Levinas distance themselves from Kant’s idea that
freedom is primary and foundational. Metz and Levinas consider that the meaning of freedom depends
on a more primordial responsibility for the other’s suffering. For both thinkers the response to an
appeal gives man the sense of freedom. As R. Clifton Spargo points out in relation to Levinas’s ethics:
“the victim is not just a scandal against knowledge. Rather, she denotes responsibility” (Spargo 2006,
p. 11). For Metz, responsibility is a key category of political theology to the extent to which the
memories of suffering bring “dangerous insights for the present” because they “make demands on
us” (Metz 1980, p. 109). Furthermore, this praxis in favor of the suffering other is, in Levinas and
Metz, essentially pathic, meaning the memory of suffering provokes a suffering in the subject who feels
himself compelled to respond. For Metz, “[t]he Jewish-Christian memoria passionis articulates itself
as a memory that makes one free to suffer from the sufferings of others, and to respect the prophetic
witness of others’ suffering” (Metz and Moltmann 1995, p. 11).
Metz and Levinas are interested in interrupting the progressive flow of knowledge that springs
from traditional historiography by positing memory as a challenging category for history. Levinas’s
immemorial memory and Metz’s dangerous memory operate as redemptive categories which prevent
history from obtaining its meaning from victors and survivors while simultaneously neglecting the cry
of the other who suffers. Furthermore, for both thinkers the concept of memory allows the relation
between history and nature to be broken, thereby overcoming the naturalized reading of past events
as something irretrievably done. In this way the past is not closed and it cannot be captured in
representation. The meaning of the past rather, is produced by exteriority in which memory is attentive
to the other’s death. This exteriority appears greater than any historiographical or philosophical order
of knowledge and compels subjectivity to react. In other words, the suffering and death of the other
makes claims on subjectivity and has a normative importance for praxis. As Levinas and Metz identify,
suffering is the authority to which all must respond: having an awareness of history and attempting to
live out of this awareness means, above all, not evading history’s disasters. It also means there is at
least one authority that we should never reject or despise—the authority of those who suffer.
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Turning to Metz’s memory, it is worth noting how dangerous memory, coupled with the concepts
of narrative and solidarity, can be. In this regard, Metz recognizes that memory is primarily a narration
rather than an argumentation. This is because memory has to do with human experiences. For Metz,
this is particularly true in the Bible, which is fundamentally a narration of the experiences of the people
of Israel in their relation with God. Christianity also acts as a community, although not “primarily a
community interpreting and arguing, but a community remembering and narrating with a practical
intention—a narrative and evocative memory of the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus” (Metz
1980, p. 212). But along with the Bible, history is also made of the experiences of non-identity through
violence and segregation, injustice and inequality. If Levinas accentuates that the memory of the
tragedies can only be revealed by those who suffer, Metz points to a memory narrated “by those
who experience them” (Metz 1980, p. 123) which cannot be systematized in arguments. From Metz’s
perspective, “these stories break through the spell of a total reconstruction based on abstract reason”
(Metz 1980, p. 214), to disrupt the present. The practical intention of memory and narrative is possible
via solidarity with those who have been defeated and killed.
3.2. Auschwitz and the Theodicy Question
Metz shares Levinas’s insight in relation to the failure of any attempt to explain suffering and
the concomitant problem that suffering poses to the concept of God. Both thinkers reject theodicy as
an attempt to make God innocent, which can lead to a trivialization of human pain. Metz affirms
that history exists as “the brittle and devastating histories of human suffering narrated by those
experiencing them,” and therefore he realizes “how they cannot be systematized in argument” (Metz
1980, p. 123). This affirmation recalls Levinas’s rejection of memory as an ontological attempt to bring
the past into the present via interpretation and his rejection of theodicy as intellectualization of the
experience of suffering. Metz’s and Levinas’s insights mean that traditional theodicy needs to be
reconsidered. Yet, there is certainly an essential difference between Levinas and Metz. The latter is a
theologian and from this perspective he is essentially thinking of the challenges that the phenomenon
of suffering implies for theology and for the praxis of the Catholic Church. The former is a Jewish
philosopher who is interested in translating the ethical message of the Bible to a broader audience,
meaning translating Hebrew (the Bible) into Greek (philosophy). Suffering is therefore, from Levinas’s
perspective, an ethical challenge for human beings, having as a background the biblical categories
framed in an anarchical responsibility.
Admittedly, Metz is convinced that theological categories are philosophically worthy of
consideration, and therefore he is prone to dialogue with philosophy. Furthermore, he considers this
dialogue a kind of testimony to the hope in the liberating power of redemption carried out by Jesus. It is
worth noting that Metz’s messianism is a weak messianism, meaning Metz emphasizes the suffering
testimony of Jesus rather than his power or mystery as the son of God. Metz underlines the social
responsibility of Jesus’s followers rather than man’s transcendental salvation or the place of miracles
in Jesus’s life. This is why for Metz memory is accomplished as memoria passionis, mortis et resurrectionis
Jesu Christi. This memory is liberating to the extent to which it remembers the testament of Christ’s love,
in which the kingdom of God appeared among men by initially establishing that kingdom between
men, by Jesus’s confession of himself as the one who was on the side of the oppressed and rejected,
and by his proclamation of the coming kingdom of God as the liberating power of unconditional love.
While Levinas talks about “theology without theodicy,” Metz considers theodicy as the central
problem of political theology. However, by looking more closely at Metz’s and Levinas’s considerations
we realize that both thinkers follow the path of Kantian theodicy as a rejection of any attempt to
explain suffering. In fact, Levinas’s end of theodicy transforms into an ethical theodicy, and Metz’s
anti-theodicy becomes theodicy as a disturbing question to God rather than the defense of God for the
suffering of the world. By being on the Kantian path, each thinker places himself against the Hegelian
philosophy of history as a theodicy in which suffering is justified in the dialectic of the progress of
Spirit. Furthermore, in speaking about suffering and death each thinker is looking at the Holocaust.
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Auschwitz, as Metz declares, became crucial for his theologizing in 1973 when writing the first draft
of the document Our Hope for the German bishop’s conference. Metz confesses with regret that too
slowly he realized how this concrete situation of suffering challenges the way in which theology had
been done. From this year onward, his memory of the Second World War becomes meaningful and the
theodicy question arises with greater force. Theology is from now on a theology “after Auschwitz,”
and therefore theology cannot remain “untouched after such a catastrophe” (Metz 1994, p. 611).
For Metz “the theodicy question, the basic theological question . . . is not ‘who saves me?’ but
rather ‘who saves you?’”, and immediately he adds “I begin not with the question, ‘What happens
to me when I suffer, when I die,’ but rather with, ‘what happens to me when you suffer, when you
die’” (Downey and Metz 1999, p. 137). Therefore, the theodicy question becomes a cry for those who
suffer unjustly, for the victims and defeated in history. For Metz, the discourse about God is about the
salvation of those who suffer in history. This means that suffering cannot be idealistically explained; in
Metz’s terms, “[t]o confront Auschwitz is in no way to comprehend it. Anyone wishing to comprehend
in this area will have comprehended nothing” (Downey and Metz 1999, p. 41). This is why Metz says:
“I consider as blasphemy every Christian theodicy (i.e., every attempt at a so-called justification of
God) and all language about meaning when these are initiated outside this catastrophe or on some
level above it” (ibid.). Metz’s statement recalls Fackhenheim’s words: “I won’t even consider finding a
purpose in Auschwitz because the very attempt to find it is blasphemous” (Fackhenheim 1989, p. 85).
These words belong to a lecture Fackhenheim delivered at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
in 1968 during a symposium on “The Future of Hope.” On this occasion, the Canadian philosopher
reflected on the challenges Auschwitz posed to Jews and to humanity. For him, this challenge is as
unique as this event: Auschwitz cannot be explained and cannot be forgotten. The response to the
despair and evil felt by the Jewish community is the commandant of hope: “testify against evil by our
very existence.” For Fackhenheim, to exist as a Jew is to be committed to hope that a second Auschwitz
will not happen.
From the perspective of the “theodicy question,” Metz criticizes how theology disposed of the
disturbing problem of justice for those who suffer unjustly, transforming it directly into a problem about
the redemption of the guilty. For Metz, there was a shift from the biblical concern with human suffering
to a concern for individual sins. In this shift, according to Metz, Augustine played an important role.
3.3. The Standstill of the Theodicy Question
In Metz, a theology sensitive to theodicy means that theology needs to look at the concrete reality
of human suffering in order to be practical. In this purpose, theology has to overcome classical theodicy,
which seeks to defend God for the suffering in the world. In spite of the term “theodicy” being coined
by Leibniz in the seventeenth century, the problem posed by evil in relation to the goodness and power
of God can be traced back earlier, particularly in the writings of Augustine. While for Levinas evil is
the excess of being, for Augustine it is lack or deficiency of being. This is the path Augustine takes in
order to respond to the problem posed by dualistic Manichaeism in relation to the double principle
operative in the world—good and evil—and also to Marcion’s dualism of the wrathful Hebrew God
and the redeemer God of the New Testament. For Manichean dualism, evil and sin are not the result of
free will, but the result of a universal and eternal principle of evil which fights with the principle of
goodness in the human soul. As William E. Mann argues, “Manichaeism thus offered a straightforward
solution for the problem of evil: God is doing the best he can against evil, but finds himself facing an
independent opponent as formidable as he” (Mann 2006, p. 40).
As stated above, Augustine responds to these dualisms by following the Plotinian solution and
considering evil as a privation and not as a substance. For Augustine the primary problem is not the
origin of evil, as the Manichean wrongly believes, but the nature of evil. In questioning this nature,
Augustine concludes that evil is the lack of goodness (privatio boni) and therefore, from a metaphysical
perspective, evil does not exist as an entity, but rather what exist are lower and higher grades of being
in relation to God, the Supreme Being. Moral evil springs from a deficiency in the election of human
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will which can choose lower beings instead of higher ones. That is, free will is a good which can be
used wrongly by humans and, therefore, evil in Augustine’s consideration has a defective cause and
not an efficient cause. In the Libero Arbitrio, according to Metz, Augustine attributes responsibility for
the evil and suffering in the world only to humanity and its history of guilt which stems from the
rejection of God.
What bothers Metz most in relation with Augustine’s perspective is the appeasement of the
questioning directed to God, questioning that demands an explanation in view of the history of
suffering in the world. In other words, Augustine’s emphasis in relation to sin and guilt attenuates
primordial attention to the suffering of man. According to Metz, by emphasizing salvation as the
redemption of sin and blame, Augustine forgets the eschatological promise of universal justice, which
also includes past suffering. From Metz’s perspective, the biblical view of salvation, the promise of
salvation in God’s name, refers not only to salvation from sin and guilt, but to the liberation of human
beings from the inscrutable situations of human suffering. In this way in classical theodicies, in line
with Augustine, the victims of history are forgotten and the possibility to respond to the cry of justice
that arises from their suffering is missed.
While in classical theodicies human suffering is forgotten by emphasizing sin and guilt in the
history of redemption, in modern theories of emancipation, concrete human suffering is hidden
in a transcendental or universal subject of history. In these theories, like Marxism for example,
suffering is integrated into a universal perspective, which for Hegel is termed “world spirit,” and for
Schelling “nature.” Furthermore, by making God the unique subject of history, the classic theodicies
end up expelling God from history in the modern, secularized theories of emancipation. From Marx’s
perspective, for example, the deus salvator is replaced by the homo emancipator. As Thompson
expresses it, “if God is the one in charge, and yet is evidently doing so little to make the human world
better, then it is time to put human beings in charge in God’s place” (Thompson 2004, p. 112). However,
both perspectives share the same failure: “[i]n Metz’s analysis, both classical theories of redemption
and modern theories of emancipation have tried to shield themselves from responsibility towards
those who suffer in history” (Thompson 2004, p. 112). From both perspectives the question of freedom
remains tied to the question: “who is to blame” for this suffering? Consequently, “who is to bear the
responsibility?” Both perspectives fall into a mechanism of exoneration from responsibility. In fact,
while the classical theodicies blame human beings for evil in order to preserve the omnipotent and
loving God, the theories of emancipation understand suffering as part of a whole project of liberation
in which progress towards a final liberation is the driving force of history. Furthermore, the theories of
emancipation exonerate themselves for history’s failures by blaming others, the enemy, for oppression
and totalitarian repression.
From Metz’s perspective, on the contrary, by assuming responsibility for history’s failures for the
suffering of other human beings, the subject becomes a “true homo emancipator” (Thompson 2004,
p. 114). This responsibility is a praxis of solidarity in which the memory of past suffering becomes the
cornerstone of such responsibility. The biblical perspective offers, according to Metz, a perspective of
redemption in which the eschatological promises of justice for the living and dead can be considered.
The solidarity based on the memory of suffering “is a practical solidarity of memory which looks from
the standpoint of the conquered and the victims sacrificed in the world theatre of history” (Metz 1980,
p. 130).
3.4. Theodicy as the Questioning of God
The central problem of theology is “the cry for the salvation of others, of those who suffer unjustly,
of the victims and the vanquished in our history” (Metz 1988, p. 55). The discourse about God is first
and foremost a question about this salvation and the truth that guides this discourse is a resistance
against every form of injustice that creates suffering. In Metz’s claim for resistance against injustice and
the hope for a better world, the influence of Bloch is evident. However, Benjamin provides Metz with a
vision of the past that moderates Bloch’s future-oriented perspective of hope. From this perspective,
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the theodicy question is eschatological in the way in which it is a hope of universal salvation, including
for those who have died. Theology does not develop its answers by reconciling everything, but rather
directs its questioning incessantly back toward God. As in Bloch’s anti-theodicy, Metz’s theodicy
question can “never be answered conclusively”, and the main task of theology is to seek “a new
language that prevents [the question] to be forgotten” (Metz 2006, p. 113).
Furthermore, Metz not only criticizes traditional theodicies, but also the theologies and
philosophies that posit suffering in God, particularly the theologies of Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Jürgen Moltmann, and Urs Von Balthasar. Levinas himself expresses it in this way: “[i]n our suffering
God suffers with us . . . It is God who suffers most in human suffering” (Levinas 1999, p. 182). In Metz’s
opinion, by positing a suffering God, or God participating in our sufferings, these theologies minimize
the negativity of suffering. The idea of a suffering God is just speculative and risks ignoring the human
history of suffering. Furthermore, it seems also a duplication of human suffering and a projection of the
discourse of solidarity in human society. Metz also wonders how the concept of a suffering God can
avoid an eternalization of suffering and can present a real fight against the causes of suffering and the
hope for liberation. The perspective of a suffering God finally falls within the Hegelian self-movement
of the Spirit and therefore it loses its force, domesticated by its conceptualization.
Against the above framing, Metz proposes Leiden an Gott. The translation of this expression into
English poses some problems as James Matthew Ashley, Metz’s translator, underlines
[i]n German Leiden an translates to suffering from, as in “suffering from a cold.” What cannot
be rendered into English is Metz’s correlation of Leiden an Gott with Riickfragen an Gott [to
re-inquire or ask again of God]. In the light of this wordplay, I have chosen “suffering unto
God” in order to express (a) that this is a form of relationship to God and (b) that it is an
active, dynamic state and not just a passive enduring (Metz 1994, p. 115).
Suffering unto God is the disturbing question which addresses God with the meaningless suffering
of others. It is understood from Israel’s poverty of spirit, which means Israel’s inability to be consoled by
strategies of evasion, by ahistorical myths, in the face of suffering “which cover[s] over the fragmented,
endangered character of human being” (Ashley 1998, p. 160).
To Metz the most appropriate linguistic form for this type of experience of God and speaking about
God is the language of prayer. This language of prayer is itself “a language of suffering, a language of
crisis, a language of doubt and of radical danger, a language of complaint and accusation, a language
of crying out” (Metz 1994, pp. 620–1). This is a language more dramatic and rebellious, more radical
and disturbing, less harmonious and less likely to conform than academic or discursive language. It is
the language of the complaint, protest, and cry. The language of prayer has a long biblical tradition
(from Job to Jesus) and even more, a long tradition throughout the history of mankind “as the most
impressive and moving document of human language of suffering” (ibid.). The language of prayer
consists of passionate questions addressed to God, demanding explanation. Therefore, the language of
suffering unto god is not primarily one of consoling answers to experiences of suffering; rather, it is
much more a language of passionate re-questioning that arises out of suffering, a re-questioning of
God, full of highly charged expectation.
This suffering unto God is experienced against a mystical backdrop which Metz terms “mysticism
of open eyes” (Metz 2006, p. 105). That is, a mysticism in which there is a “growing perception of
others’ suffering,” and therefore compassion and responsibility. From Metz’s perspective, Christianity
is a religion of crisis and combative hope rather than one of a friendly God. As Martinez says, it is a
religion “that disquiets, interrupts, contradicts, endangers, and forces one to have hope against all
hope in an unending praxis of universal justice, solidarity and peace that is always suspended by the
catastrophes of history” (Martinez 2001, p. 86). From the perspective of the “mystic of open eyes,”
the structure of the “I” is transformed into compassion, which means the disposition to be interrupted
by the suffering of others and parallelly to recognize the authority of those who suffer. From Metz’s
perspective, compassion is the specific legacy of the Bible for Europe.
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Metz’s mysticism of open eyes leads primarily towards an encounter with faces. In fact, Metz
clarifies that Christian hope cannot be spoken about in a general way, but must remain grounded in
the concrete historical–social situation in which subjects find themselves: their experiences, suffering,
struggles, and obstacles. Levinas also points out that responsibility stems from the encounter with the
other who “has the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan” (Levinas 1969, p. 251).
However, Levinas insists that the concept of face goes beyond material contours and even “the best
way of encountering the other is not even to notice the colour of his eyes!” (Levinas 1985, p. 85). Metz
coincides with Levinas about the significance of the face as a hermeneutical tool to approach others’
suffering and therefore responsibility.
However, for Metz, the material reality of face has something to say: it reflects struggles, suffering,
and hope. In fact, when visiting Latin America in 1988, Metz had the opportunity to find concrete
faces of suffering. He discovered the faces of men, women, and children reflecting poverty and sorrow,
and particularly found the face of the indios: “short faces, black faces . . . and in their eyes, dreams,
desires, or even tears were seen” (Metz 1997, p. 129). However, not only was suffering and sadness
reflected in these faces, resistance was also found. That is, resistance against the accelerating time
of modernity, and against the mechanism of evasion, as well as strategies for the immunization of
post-modern mentalities in relation to universal responsibility. In fact, according to Metz, by thinking
on a small scale, in varied fragments, postmodernity ends up in a privatization of life and therefore in
an attitude of a spectator before the situations of crises and suffering in the world.
In spite of being only a partial vision of Latin American society, Metz’s encounter with concrete
faces gave him the opportunity to materialize his conviction that the logos of theology must be
interrupted by the face of the other. Furthermore, in the encounter with the face of the other, Metz and
Levinas discover a face which summons the subject as an authority and a victim at the same time; that
is, this encounter discloses an asymmetrical relationship in which the one summoned to respond feels
him/herself compelled to respond.
3.5. The Asymmetrical Relationship
In Memoria Passionis, Metz speaks in similar words to Levinas in relation to interhuman
relationships: the relationship with the other must be non-symmetrical. For Metz, the symmetrical
relationships of recognition, typical of modern advanced societies, do not go beyond the logic of
market relations, trade, and competition. Only the non-symmetric relations, that is, the concern for the
others excluded and forgotten, break the power of this logic. For both Levinas and Metz, the suffering
other interrupts the time in which the subject feels comfortable by requesting a response. This is also
why Metz and Levinas criticize the Buberian I-Thou relationship. For Metz, this relationship is too
private to reach social meaning, for Levinas it is too symmetrical. For Metz, it is apolitical, for Levinas
it is ethically insufficient. Both Metz and Levinas are thinking how to do justice to the victims so far
irremediably laid aside by history.
In this asymmetry, Levinas emphasizes the interhuman relationship as a concern for the other
without reciprocity. In this sense, Levinas manifests: “I am responsible for the Other without waiting
for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair” (Levinas 1985, p. 98). This is so because
the responsibility for the other, which is the fundamental ethical obligation, is not imposed as an
imperative of an existing consciousness, but is prior to self and its principle of individuation. In being
ethical, this asymmetry derives from a fundamental inequality between the subject and the other.
For Levinas, in the ethical horizon, the other always takes precedence. This means that before meeting
the other and grasping its qualities, the subject is called upon to respond to the other’s fate, even to the
other’s own responsibility. That is, the interhuman is primarily an ethical face-to-face relationship and
derivatively political. In the political order the fundamental non-symmetry is an excess because the
political is the order of the citizens, of the equals. Therefore, Levinas does not reject the equality of
human beings, but this equality is derived and non-original. In the ethical order,
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the interhuman lies also in the recourse that people have to one another for help, before
the marvelous alterity of the Other has been banalized or dimmed in a simple exchange of
courtesies which become established as an ‘interpersonal commerce’ of customs (Levinas
1998a, p. 165).
However, unlike Levinas’s derived equality, Metz is thinking of the fundamental equality among
human beings. Under this equality, paradoxically, the victims emerge as authorities to the extent to
which their suffering concerns us. Put in other words, for Metz, the authority of the suffering other
emerges because human beings are essentially equal and therefore the victims are not in unequal
conditions in relation to the traditional protagonists of history. On the contrary, the victims claim a
privileged consideration due to their vulnerable condition. This authority of those who suffer compels
a political response which Metz terms compassion. In Levinas’s and Metz’s consideration, a gap is
produced between the Other who suffers and those who respond. While Levinas’s ethical relation of
face-to-face encounters brings to light an essential difference of the self and the Other, Metz is primarily
contemplating a subject among other subjects as part of a community. In fact,
the word subject does not refer to the isolated individual, the monad who only afterwards
made sure of his coexistence with other subjects. Experiences of solidarity with, antagonism
towards, liberation from, and anxiety about other subjects form an essential part of the
constitution of the religious subject (Metz 1980, p. 61).
This difference between Levinas’s prioritization of ethics and Metz’s prioritization of politics
leads Thompson to affirm that their responses were shaped “by different commitments: Levinas
stressed the duty to respond to the other who is always other, whereas Metz focused more on the
human community that he sees as the ultimate goal of such an encounter”. Therefore, “for Levinas,
unlike for Metz, this authority also produces a kind of unbridgeable difference between the other who
suffers and those who are duty-bound to respond” (Thompson 2004, p. 154). In spite of Thompson
catching the essential difference between each thinker, her conclusion about Levinas’s “unbridgeable
difference” lacks full consideration of the political equality of human beings, as emphasized above.
Levinas’s interest is ethical because ethics is for him primordial, but political equality is a reality that
Levinas does not ignore, even if he does not develop a political theory or political consequences for his
ethical approach.
Turning to Metz’s response to suffering, it should be noted that for the German theologian
compassio is not a religious romanticism but a practical response in which hatred and violence have
been removed. This authority signifies that the response to those who suffer is fundamental as a
source of meaning for ethics. In fact, the obedience to this authority tests the righteousness of any
ethics that do not want to become “ethics of accommodation” or justification, meaning an ethics “that
seeks to reconcile human actions with the ever changing practical circumstances” (Metz 1999b, p. 232).
Furthermore, this authority obliges all human beings prior to any agreement and therefore cannot be
sidestepped by any culture or religion, for example, in terms of cultural and religious understanding.
The authority of those who suffer is weak because it stems from the margins, but is at the same time
strong because it cannot be evaded by ethics, politics, culture or religion. Beyond the above-mentioned
difference in relation to the priority of ethics or politics, both Metz and Levinas have the same interest:
the non-identity of the experience of a victim’s suffering. They see the suffering other as an authority,
both a weak and strong authority because it is vulnerable and also makes demands. From this
perspective, the unjustifiable suffering of the other opens up the ethical and political perspectives of
the interhuman.
Moreover, Metz is in accord with Levinas in considering that the primordial relationship
between meaningless suffering and death calls into question “our sealed-up identities” (Schuster and
Bochert-Kimmig 1999, pp. 33–34). For Metz, the identity of the subject is always threatened and at the
same time opened to full disclosure depending on the position adopted in relation to the other’s death
and suffering. Although the subject can adopt a mechanism of evasion in relation to responsibility, for
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Metz, subjectivity is essentially tied to the suppressed or repressed other. From Metz’s perspective,
as well as from Levinas’s, it is the death of the other which “radically destabilizes our attempts to find
and create meaning in our present” (Ashley 1998, p. 157). In this way, both Levinas and Metz are at
odds with the Heideggerian claim that the anticipation of death is a call of the authentic self whose
own death offers the authentic meaning of death. On the contrary, because death is the call of the
other’s suffering it affects subjectivity and becomes the authority to which we have to respond.
Regarding the relation between suffering and reason, Candace Mac Lean affirms that the former
“has the power to direct practical reason, as freedom” (McLean 2012, pp. 62–63). In fact, the autonomy
of reason is dialectically anchored here in an act of recognition, the recognition of the authority of
those who suffer undeserved and unjustly. In Metz’s view, this recognition protects reason from any
instrumentalization or functionalization, and justifies a non-ideological claim of universality because it
is able to generate consent in circumstances which are strictly pluralist. Furthermore, in the dialectical
nature of Metz’s perspective, the inappropriateness of both the previous hermeneutic explanation and
the subsequent discursive strengthening of the authority of those who suffer, is highlighted. If the
explanation and discourse were the case, obedience would lead to intellection. On the contrary, the first
thing is not to discuss suffering, but to respond to it. In this regard, the encounter with the suffering of
others is a “state of exception” that interrupts normal life guided by forgetfulness.
4. Conclusions
This paper has moved from the concept of memory to that of responsibility, articulated by a
critique of any attempt to explain suffering from religious or historical perspectives. In this way,
the inadequacy and insufficiency of any theoretical attempt to justify or explain suffering has emerged,
and therefore an ethical commitment in relation to the victims has also arisen. This commitment is
shaped by a response to the cry of the victims which summons the subject to understand freedom
as limited and subordinated to ethical responsibility. This commitment stems both from Levinas’s
historical experience of persecution and from Levinas’s biblical commitment from which he has learned
that the responsibility for a fellow human is a reasonable way to think and live.
Levinas’s declaration of the end of theodicy shows that beyond the subject of intentional acts
(Husserl) or that of comprehension (Heidegger), a subject in anticipation exposed to the interpellation
of the other is awake. Traditional theodicy is a scandalous attempt to ignore the cry of the victims of
history via a theoretical explanation of evil and human suffering. This theoretical perspective is based
on an idealism in which freedom is the quintessence of the constitution of the subject. On the contrary,
in the responsible subject, in messianic subjectivity, freedom is limited by the cries of the victims, and
the subject is therefore “subjected to the other.” Furthermore, the other of the asymmetrical relation is
a victim and therefore comes from above and appears as ethically superior to the subject due to his or
her suffering. It is the asymmetry of the relation with the victim that obligates the subject.
In Levinas’s estimation, memory is the memory of the immemorial, that is, of the trace of the
infinity that is present in the face of the victims. Since the victims are ethically beyond the subject’s
powers this memory is brought by the victims themselves. The victims whose epiphany is the trace of
God invokes ethical commitment. Metz for his part proclaims that the impassivity of the logos has to
be substituted by the compassion of memory. The role that memory plays in Metz’s thinking is central
in his attempt to do justice to the victims. What Metz argues is that memory is not thinking, nor a
work of collecting information, but rather a voice crying out. In relation to memory both Metz and
Levinas attempt to get rid of a memory understood as anamnesis, that is, as an act of comprehension,
an act of recollection.
Levinas and Metz’s perspectives of memory distance themselves from public memories in
which the cultural industry and the politics of memory converge. The proliferation of memorials,
the multiplication of commemorative monuments, the media transformation of traumatic occurrences
into banal events and their sensationalist exploitation, rather than a culture of memory, seem to
expunge from memory and facilitate oblivion.
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Levinas is emphatic in proclaiming the end of theodicy; Metz for his part considers the theodicy
question the core of his political theology. However, Metz’s theodicy is unorthodox from the catholic
perspective. It is rather an anti-theodicy as long as he considers “blasphemy” to be an attempt to justify
God in relation to human suffering. Both Levinas’s and Metz’s rejection of traditional theodicy stems
from the experience of Auschwitz as the paradigm of gratuitous suffering. For Levinas, the response to
Auschwitz is an ethical responsibility able to become hostage of the other’s suffering, which for Metz
is a political resistance transformed into compassion.
In this line of thinking, the logos of theology and philosophy must be interrupted by the face of
the other who speaks from his/her historical experiences of destitution and neglect. In a strikingly
similar way Levinas and Metz want to show that everything “about truth,” is in its origin an answer to
the problem posed by the unjust pain of the victim. Indeed, this makes it clear that memory is a voice
crying out, rather than a recollection of information about the past. Metz states that the impassivity
of the logos has to be substituted by the compassion of memory. For him, remembering and telling
(memory and narrative) are Jewish legacies that can be obscured by an ahistorical dualism stemming
from the Hellenistic legacy.
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